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1. INTRODUCTION
When speaking about conflicts between fundamental rights, we have the impres-
sion that we speak about something special. We feel that it is more problematic if
the right to respect for one's religion is hurt by blasphemous speech, than if an
individual economic interest is harmed by the discontinuance of an allowance.
The perceived special character of fundamental rights has an important influence
on judicial method. Courts appear to be Willing to decide a case concerning an
infringement ofa classic fundamental right, such as a civil or political right, since
they feel they can do so on the basis of clear legal standards. On the other hand,
they are reluctant to adjudicate claims concerning social or economic interests, as
they consider political and policy arguments to be of more importance there.
Accordingly, courts generally show a larger measure of deference in the latter
type of case than in cases concerning clearly identifiable individual interests or
rights.'
The question is, however, whether the distinction we make between "classic"
fundamental rights and other interests is always reasonable and if it is justifiable
to attach far-reaching judicial consequences to the distinction. It is doubtful
whether it really is easier to adjudicate fundamental rights cases than claims con-
cerning an infringement ofother individual interests. Cases concerning the desir-
ability ofan abortion2 or the permissibility of threatening someone with violence
to protect another person's life, 3 would seem to be far more difficult to decide than
a relatively straightforward case concerning the loss of milk quota for reasons of
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agricultural policy. In addition, the line between fundamental rights and other
interests cannot always be drawn easily. This is true in particular because of the
"proliferation" of classic fundamental rights over the last few decades, which has
had the result of ever more individual interests being classified as (aspects of)
fundamental rights.
Hence, there is good reason to reconsider the view that cases concerning (con-
flicts between) classic fundamental rights form a special category and deserve
special judicial scrutiny. The choice of judicial method and intensity of review
should not solely depend on the question whether an individual interest is pro-
tected by the European Convention on Human Rights or by other national or
international instruments containing enforceable fundamental rights. It is the
purpose of this paper to elaborate this thesis on the basis of the case law of the
European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), the European Court of Justice (ECn
and, where relevant, administrative courts in the Netherlands and the United
Kingdom.
First, some background will be provided through a rough sketch of the schol-
arly debate about the difference between various types of fundamental rights and
interests and the value of the proliferation of rights (Section 2.1). Then a general
overview will be provided of the proliferation of fundamental rights and the
resulting blurring of the line between fundamental rights and other interests,
focusing on the case law of the ECtHR and the ECJ (Sections 2.2 and 2.3). In Sec-
tion 3, the thesis will be elaborated that courts currently distinguish between fun-
damental rights and other interests in choosing their methods of review, taking
the administrative case law in the UK, the Netherlands and the ECJ as examples.
On basis of these analyses, a number ofconclusions will be reached regarding the
difference between "fundamental rights" and interests in the assessment methods
of the national and European courts. Also, a tentative effort will be made to for-
mulate an alternative approach (Section 4).
2. PROLIFERATION OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS IN
THE CASE LAW OF THE ECtHR AND THE ECJ
2.1. INTRODUCTION: DIFFERENT TYPES OF RIGHTS AND
THE NORMATIVE DEBATE ABOUT PROLIFERATION
The rights protected by international treaties such as the European Convention of
Human Rights (ECHR) and the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights (ICCPR), are mainly "classic" fundamental rights. Such rights are often
classified as "first generation rights", which generally can be defined as basic
political and civil rights of the individual that can be enforced against the
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government.' These rights are primarily "negative" in character, which means
that they do not so much impose an active duty on the state to provide for rights-
accommodating facilities, as a negative duty to refrain from interfering with the
exercise of such rights by the individual. 5 By contrast, social, economic and cul-
tural rights are often termed "second generation rights". These rights generally
qualify as "positive rights", requiring active engagement by the government based
on a principle of progressive achievement." Such positive second generation rights
are generally considered to be less easily enforceable. They principally place a
moral duty on the government to provide a certain level of protection of these
rights, defining a social ideal rather than recognising a legal right.? Because of the
different (legal) character of these second generation rights, they have been laid
down in separate human rights instruments (such as the European Social Charter
and the International Covenant of Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights), which
provide for a different system ofenforcement and monitoring and do not envisage
an individual complaints procedure."
Although the distinction between positive and negative rights, or first and
second-generation rights, might seem to be a rather clear one at first glance, the
value of the distinction has always been disputed. It is well accepted that rights
from both generations or categories may contain elements of the other? and it is
6
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See for the distinction between these generations generally C. Tomuschat, Human Rights.
Between Idealism and Realism, 24 (Oxford: OUP 2003). Third generation rights (rights of soli-
darity within groups) will not be discussed in this paper, as they are less relevant to the distinc-
tion between "fundamental rights" and other individual interests. See more specifically e.g. P.
Alston, A Third Generation of Solidarity Rights: Progressive Development or Obfuscation of
International Human Rights Law?', 29 Netherlands International Law Review 307-322, 309
(1982). It is important to note, furthermore, that the use of the term "generations" has rightly
been criticised. Alston has stated, for example, that generations by definition pass away, a new
generation constantly replacing the former one. This is clearly not true for the various "genera-
tions" of human rights, which appear to co-exist and do not replace each other over time (P.
Alston, supra, 316). Perhaps it would therefore be better to speak of "categories" or "types" of
rights.
The classic distinction between positive and negative rights is well explained by C. Fabre, Con-
stitutionalising Social Rights, 6 The Journal ofPolitical Philosophy 263-284 (1998).
Cf C. Wellman, The Proliferation of Rights. Moral Progress or Empty Rhetorics, 22 (Boulder:
Westview Press 1999).
Ibid. There is some controversy about this, as it has sometimes been stated that there is a legal
'duty to respect' also with regard to social and economic rights. As far as minimum core obli-
gations are concerned, all states must be able to provide them (c. Tomuschat, supra note 4,
47).
See D.J. Harris and J. Darcy, The European Social Charter (Ardsley: Transnational Publishers
2001). An Additional Protocol to the European Social Charter provides for a collective com-
plaints procedure, however, entitling a number of organisations (e.g. trade unions and NGOs)
to lodge complaints with the European Committee of Social Rights (see Additional Protocol to
the European Social Charter Providing for a System of Collective Complaints, CETS No.
158).
See in particular C. Fabre, supra note 5, 267-268, explaining that even a right such as the right
to be tried by a jury, is not an entirely negative right, since it demands that a whole state
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often held that effective protection of "negative" rights may impose active duties
upon national authorities.!" It might even be argued that no sharp distinction can
be drawn between the generations at all-it would indeed be more accurate to say
that many "classic" fundamental rights also cover aspects of social and economic
rights, and vice versa.
Some scholars have, however, made a case for restricting the scope of negative
fundamental rights to their very core. In their view, the borderline between polit-
ical/civil rights and social/economic rights should be drawn much more sharply.
An eloquent supporter of this plea is Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice, a former judge with
the European Court of Human Rights. He wrote a sharply phrased dissenting
opinion in the Marckx-case of 1979, where the majority held that the fact that, in
Belgium, no maternal affiliation was established directly after the birth of an ille-
gitimate child, constituted a violation of the right to respect for one's family life as
protected by Article 8. Judge Fitzmaurice argued that the gist of the European
Convention of Human Rights was to protect individuals against the cc••• whole
gamut of fascist and communist inquisitorial practices ...", and he went on to
state that "[sjuch, and not the internal, domestic regulation of family relation-
ships, was the object of Article 8, and it was for the avoidance of these horrors,
tyrannies and vexations that 'private and family life ... home and ... correspond-
ence' were to be respected, and the individual endowed with the right to enjoy
that respect-not for the regulation of the civil status of babies".'! Thus, Judge
Fitzmaurice would rather limit the protection offered by the European Conven-
tion of Human Rights to the very core of the various rights, than extend their
scope in order to cover other important individual interests. The reason for a plea
such as this one is that protection is considered stronger if it is restricted to a lim-
ited number of rights of which the importance for the individual is immediately
obvious. For this very reason, other scholars have objected to the acceptance of
"peripheral" rights as fundamental rights, stating that such acceptance might be
counterproductive.l- or distort the usefulness of human rights as an ordering
concept.P Some have even argued that the proliferation of (moral) rights "encour-
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apparatus be established. See further also I.E. Koch, Economic, Social and Cultural Rights as
Components in Civil and Political Rights: A Hermeneutic Perspective, 10 International Jour-
nal ofHuman Rights 405,406 (2006), C. Tomuschat, supra note 4, 46 and C. Wellman, supra
note 6, 26.
This perspective is especially visible in the case law of the European Court of Human Rights;
cf the well known case of Plattform "Arzte fur das Leben" v. Austria, ECtHR 21 June 1988,
Series A, vol. 139.
ECtHR 13June 1979,Marckx v. Belgium, Series A, Vol. 31,dissenting opinion Judge Sir Gerald
Fitzmaurice, para. 7.
Cf. c. Wellman, supra note 6, 6.
P. Alston, supra note 4, 315.
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ages an egoistic pursuit of self-interest and the neglect of social responsibilities",14
and courts and legislatures should therefore be cautious of widening the defini-
tion of rights to encompass an ever-growing number of less important interests.
The debate about first and second generation rights, and the debate about
"core rights" and "peripheral rights", form the background for this section's dis-
cussion of the way in which the case law of the ECtHR and the ECJ has gradually
developed over the last fiftyyears. The focus will be placed on the question whether
a "proliferation" of fundamental rights-and the concomitant blurring of the line
between civil/political and social/economic rights-is indeed visible in European
case law. Firstly, an overview will be given of the case law of the ECtHR (section
2.2), and subsequently the case law of the ECJ will be addressed (section 2.3).
2.2. THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS
2.2.1. Positive Obligations and the Proliferation ofConvention Rights
The European Convention of Human Rights is a "classic" fundamental rights
instrument in the sense that it only contains provisions relating to civil and polit-
ical rights, such as the right to life, the prohibition of torture, the freedom of
expression and the right to property. Indeed, in drafting the Convention, the
States agreed that only negative obligations would be imposed, the main purpose
of the Convention being to prevent State authorities from interfering with indi-
vidual rights and Iiberties.l" In that respect, it might have come as a surprise to at
14
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See further C. Wellman supra note 6, 3 and M.A. Glendon, Rights Talk. The Impoverishment of
Political Discourse (New York: The Free Press 1991), in particular 171. Some arguments against
proliferation of rights have been refuted by arguing that they are primarily based on the falla-
cies of the theory of communitarianism (e.g. J. Mahoney 2007, The Challenge ofHuman Rights.
Origin, Development and Significance, 92 (Malden: Blackwell 2007». The aim of this paper is
not, however, to engage in the moral debate regarding the desirability of the expansion of
fundamental rights. Instead, we intend to show the actual occurrence of a proliferation oflegal
rights and the consequences thereof for legal protection of such rights. For that reason, the
discussion between communitarians and non-communitarians will not be dealt with in this
paper.
See P.H. Teitgen, Introduction to the European Convention on Human Rights, in: R.S.J.
Macdonald, F. Matscher and H. Petzold (eds.), The European System for the Protection of
Human Rights 3-14, 10 (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 1993), clarifying that this was precisely
the reason that some borderline rights, such as the right to property and the right to free edu-
cation, were not included in the Convention itself, but in the First Protocol. Interestingly, the
States are still reluctant to accept positive obligations under the Convention, as clearly appears
from the drafting history of Protocol 12 to the Convention (containing an independent prohi-
bition of discrimination), which entered into force on 1 April 2005. The Explanatory Report to
the Protocol expressly states that the Protocol embodies a primarily negative obligation for the
states, i.e. the obligation not to discriminate and to refrain from making unjustified distinc-
tions between individuals or groups (Explanatory Report, para. 24-26). See further J.H.
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least some of the States that the ECtHR ruled in its 1979 decision in the Marckx
case that the State authorities' obligations were not merely negative in character,
but could also sometimes require active engagement:
CCBy proclaiming in paragraph 1 the right to respect for family life, Article 8 signifies
firstly that the State cannot interfere with the exercise of that right otherwise than in
accordance with the strict conditions set out in paragraph 2. As the Court stated in the
'Belgian Linguistic' case, the object of the Article is 'essentially' that ofprotecting the
individual against arbitrary interference by the public authorities (judgment of23 July
1968, Series A no. 6, p. 33, para. 7). Nevertheless it does not merely compel the State to
abstain from such interference: in addition to this primarily negative undertaking, there
may be positive obligations inherent in an effective 'respect' for family life."16
The Marckx decision started off a long line of case law in which the European
Court of Human Rights consistently imposed positive obligations on the States
actively to protect the rights contained in the Convention. In developing and
applying its doctrine of positive obligations, the Court has brought many social
and economic individual interests under the scope of the Convention. This is per-
haps best visible in the case law with respect to Article 8 of the Convention, which
contains the right to respect for one's private and family life and one's home.
Nowadays, this right not only affords protection against such clear interferences
as unwarranted searches or against criminal punishment because of one's homo-
sexual orientation, but it also applies in many cases which could be considered as
coming purely under administrative law. Various judgments of the Court can be
mentioned to illustrate this development.
Firstly, a group of cases can be mentioned that relate to individual interests
connected with environmental protection. One of the first cases about this sub-
ject to come before the Court was the case of Lopez Ostra. I ? Mrs Lopez Ostra and
her family lived close to a plant for the treatment of liquid and solid waste, which,
owing to a malfunction, released gas fumes, pestilential smells and contamina-
tion, which caused health problems and nuisance to the Lopez Ostra family and
other families living nearby. The town council reacted by ordering cessation of
part of the activities of the plant, but nuisances continued to endanger the health
of the families living close by. At first glance, this would seem to be a purely
administrative law case concerning environmental law and industrial planning
policies, and serious failure by the government effectivelyto enforce the relevant
regulations. The case clearly touches on important individual interests, such as
16
17
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Gerards, Protocol No. 12 - The Dutch Debate, in: S. Lagoutte (ed.), Prohibition ojDiscrimina-
tion in the Nordic Countries: The Complicated Fate oJProtocol No. 12 to the European Conven-
tion on Human Rights 37,43 (Copenhagen: Danish Institute of Human Rights, 2005).
Marcxk v. Belgium, supra note 11,para. 3l.
ECtHR 9 December 1994, Lopez Ostra v. Spain, Series A, Vol. 303-C.
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public health and the interest to remain free of nuisance, but these come a long
way from the central interests as defined by Judge Gerald Fitzmaurice in his dis-
sent in the Marckx case. Indeed, the individual interests come rather close to the
rights laid down in social rights instruments, such as the right to protection of the
environment and the right to health. Nevertheless, the Court recognised the
importance of the interests concerned, stating that severe environmental pollu-
tion might affect individuals' well-being and prevent them from enjoying their
homes in such a way as to impact adversely upon their private and family life.IS It
then found that the town council had violated its positive obligations to protect
the right to private life, since it had not succeeded in striking a fair balance
between the town's economic interests and the effective enjoyment of Mrs Lopez
astra's right to respect for her home and her private and family life.'?
The Lopez Ostra case makes clear that the Court is willing to accept important
individual interests as part of the fundamental rights protected by the Conven-
tion, even ifthey are chiefly social or environmental in nature.e" It may be argued,
however, that in this case the environmental pollution was so severe and danger-
ous that there was an obvious link between the nuisance caused and the effective
enjoyment ofprivate life. For that reason, the Court's decision may not be regarded
as highly surprising. Notably, however, the Court has extended the reasoning
developed in Lopez Ostra to cases where there is a less clear-cut relationship
between the interests concerned and the rights protected by the Convention. A
good example is the case of Moreno Gomez, which concerned noise pollution
caused by the exploitation of discotheques and nightclubs in a residential neigh-
bourhood in Valencia.I' Mrs Moreno Gomez complained to the town council
about sleeping problems, yet nothing was done to enforce the existing noise level
regulations or reduce the nuisance. Once again, this case would not seem to con-
cern real fundamental rights, but rather seems to constitute a local planning case
to be decided according to national administrative law. For that reason, it is inter-
esting to see that the ECtHR decided to declare the case admissible and held that
"[t]he individual has a right to respectfor his home, meaning not just the right to the
actual physical area, but also to the quiet enjoyment of that area." It went on to
state that, for Article 8 to be applicable to the individual interests concerned, it
was required that the nuisance caused by the noise attained a "minimum level of
severity". The Court found that the volume of the noise at stake in Moreno
Gomez-at night and beyond the permitted levels-and the fact that it continued
over a number ofyears, did indeed attain this level ofseverity. By failing to enforce
18
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Lopez Ostra v. Spain, supra note 17, para. 51.
Id., para. 58.
This has often been confirmed in later cases concerning the same subject. See e.g. ECtHR 9
June 2005, Fadayeva v.Russia.
ECtHR 16November 2004, Moreno Gomez v. Spain, Reports 2004-X.
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the noise regulations, the town council had breached its positive obligations under
Article 8 of the Convention.
It appears from this decision and similar judgments concerning noise levels-?
that the Court is willing to comprise a wide range of individual interests under
the scope of the Convention, at least if a minimum levelof severity of the interfer-
ence has been attained. The focus of the review thereby seems to have shifted from
the character and weight of the actual interests and rights, to the seriousness of
the infringement of these interests. As a consequence of this approach, the Court
has been able to deal with many cases, which do not so much concern classic civil
or political rights, as "softer" (though still important!) individual interests of a
rather social or economic nature. It can only be concluded that a proliferation of
the rights protected by Article 8 ECHR is clearly visible here.P
Similar developments are visible elsewhere, especially in the area of social
security and health law. Although the Court has been somewhat reluctant to rec-
ognise new rights in this area, it has certainly created some important positive
obligations for the States. Once again, the relevant criterion in this regard seems
to be the existence of a "direct and immediate link" between the social measures
sought by the individual and the effects for his own private life and well-being.
This is illustrated by the Court's admissibility decision in the case of Marzari.i"
The case was brought by a severely disabled man who did not have adequate and
suitable accommodation to meet his special needs. According to the applicant,
the State had not lived up to its obligation to provide such accommodation and,
22
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E.g. ECtHR 21 February 1990, Powell and Rayner v. the United Kingdom, Series A, Vol. 172,
and ECtHR Grand Chamber 7 August 2003, Hatton and Others v. the United Kingdom, Reports
2003-VIII.
It is clear, though, that the scope of Article 8 is not unlimited. In the area of environmental law
and urban planning, this appears from cases such as Kyrtatos (ECtHR 23 May 2003, Kyrtatos
v. Greece, Reports 2003-VI). The complaint in this case concerned a number of Greek planning
decisions, which would result in a destruction of the natural environment where the applicants
were living-a wetland area, or, as the Court called it, a swamp. In its decision, the Court noted
that the threshold for the applicability of Article 8 was the presence of an actual harmful effect
on a person's private and family sphere. Evidence of a general deterioration of the environment
would not be sufficient to prove this effect, as the Convention was not designed to provide
general protection of the environment. The Court thus made clear that not every environmen-
tal interest is protected by the Convention-a clear and direct link to one's own situation of
living would need to be established. This seems to be an altogether reasonable and acceptable
limitation, although the Court added the rather puzzling obiter dictum that its conclusion
might have been otherwise if "... for instance, the environmental deterioration complained of
had consisted in the destruction ofa forest area in the vicinity of the applicants' house, a situa-
tion which could have affected more directly the individual's own well-being." This addition still
seems to leave an opening for other environmental law cases to be brought before the Court-
as soon as individual harm is demonstrable, no further questions seem to be asked as to the
classification of the relevant interests as real "fundamental" rights.
ECtHR 4 May 1999,Marzari v. Italy.
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consequently, it had infringed his rights under Article 8 of the Convention. The
Court agreed with the applicant:
"... although Article 8 does not guarantee the right to have one's housingproblem solved
by the authorities, a refusal of the authorities to provide assistance in this respect to an
individual sufferingfrom a severe disease might in certain circumstances raise an issue
under Article 8 ofthe Convention because ofthe impact ofsuch refusal on the private life
of the individual."
The Court thus found in this case that the interests of the applicant were protected
by Article 8, even though it finally held that the local authorities had made suffi-
cient effort to find adequate housing as to discharge their positive obligations in
respect of the right to respect for the individual's private life.
It may be derived at the least from a case such as Marzari, that the Court is
sometimes prepared to bring primarily social interests under the scope of the
classic right of respect for one's private life.25Ifcompared to the situations men-
tioned by Judge Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice in his dissenting opinion to the Marckx
decision, the case law of the Court seems to have come a long way indeed.
2.2.2. Evolutive Interpretation and the Proliferation ofFundamental Rights
It has been shown in the above that the doctrine of positive obligations constitutes
an important vehicle to bring social, economic and environmental individual
interests within the reach of the Convention rights. However, the doctrine of pos-
itive obligations is not the only instrument that is used by the Court to widen the
scope of the Convention. An additional tool in this regard is the principle of evo-
lutive and dynamic interpretation. According to a well-known Court formula, the
Convention is a "living instrument", which must be interpreted in the light of
"present day conditions'V" In practice, this means that the Court will add new
aspects to the scope of a Convention right as soon as it has become clear that such
aspects have become accepted throughout the Council of Europe to be part of the
notion of "fundamental rights".27 Moreover, the Court has used the phrase to add
25
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It must be admitted, though, that the Court has refined its position in a later case by holding
that "... Article 8 cannot be considered applicable each time an individual's everyday life is dis-
rupted, but only in exceptional cases where the State's failure to adopt measures interferes with
[the] individual's right to personal development and his or her right to establish and maintain
relations with other human beings or the outside world" (ECtHR 8 July 2003, Sentges v. the
Netherlands). It is not very clear in what kind of situation the Court will accept the presence of
such an exceptional case, however, as it often avoids the issue by judging that the authorities
have complied with their obligations anyway.
See e.g. ECtHR 7 July 1989,Soering v. the United Kingdom, Series A, Vol. 161,para. 87.
See further on this S.c. Prebensen, Evolutive Interpretation of the European Convention on
Human Rights, in: P. Mahoney (ed.), Protecting Human Rights: The European Perspective.
Studies in memory of Rolv RyssdaI1l23-1137, 1128 (Koln: Heymanns, 2000). The best known
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valuable new dimensions to rights in order to create more uniformity within the
European Union) by means of its method of autonomous interpretation.I" This
has even happened in those cases where a common ground as to the correct
understanding of a certain phrase or provision does not (or not yet) exist. With
respect to notions that are central to the European Convention) a lack of common
ground may even be regarded by the Court as a reason for autonomous interpre-
tation) since unreasonable differences in the level of protection of fundamental
rights must be avoided. Good examples of this can be found in the case law con-
cerning the notion of"civil rights and obligations" as contained in Article 6 of the
Convention) 29 the notion of "property» as contained in Article 1 of the First
Protocol,30 or the notion of "family life»as contained in Article 8.31
In searching for an autonomous interpretation of Convention notions) the
Court has often opted for a rather wide definition of the rights at hand. It has
thereby interpreted some classicfundamental rights notions so widely as to extend
their scope to aspects of economic and social rights. A recent example is the case
of Stec, in which the question was raised whether welfare benefits) such as unem-
ployment or old age benefits) constituted "property» in the sense of Article 1 of
28
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example in this regard is a series of cases concerning legal recognition of gender transforma-
tion. In its first case about the subject, Rees, the Court held that there was not yet any European
common ground which would justify a further reaching interpretation of the right to respect
for privacy, which would also cover the need to adapt a birth register to someone's new gender
(17October 1986,Rees v. the United Kingdom, Series A, Vol. 106, para. 37). In later cases it held
on to this judgment, finding that the legal developments were not yet sufficient to justify a dif-
ferent interpretation (see ECtHR, 27 September 1990, Cossey v. the United Kingdom, Series A,
Vol. 184, ECtHR, 25 March 1992, B. v. France, Series A, Vol. 232-C, and ECtHR 30 July 1998,
Sheffield and Horsham v. the United Kingdom, Reports 1998-V). In 2003, however, the Court
concluded that by that date a clear development was visible into the direction oflegal recogni-
tion of gender transformations, which was sufficient to warrant a new interpretation of the
Convention so as to include a right to recognition of one's "new" gender (ECtHR 11 July 2002,
Christine Goodwin v. the United Kingdom, Reports 2002-VI, para. 74-75). Thus, the growing
international legal consensus constituted an essential basis for a new, evolutive interpretation
and an extension of the protection offered by the Convention.
On the concept of autonomous interpretation, see G. Letsas, The Truth in Autonomous Con-
cepts: How to Interpret the ECHR, 15 European Journal of International Law 279-305, 282
(2004).
A good example is the case of Pellegrin v. France, in which the Court held that "... it is impor-
tant, with a view to applying Article 6 para. 1, to establish an autonomous interpretation of the
term 'civil service' which would make it possible to afford equal treatment to public servants
performing equivalent or similar duties in the States Parties to the Convention, irrespective ofthe
domestic system of employment and, in particular, whatever the nature of the legal relation
between the official and the administrative authority ... " (ECtHR 8 December 1999, Pellegrin v.
France, Reports 1999-VII, para. 63).
See in particular ECtHR 23 February 1995, Gasus Dosier- end Fordertechnik v. the Nether-
lands, Series A, Vol. 306-B, para. 53; see also the case of Stec v. the United Kingdom, infra note
43, to be discussed hereinafter.
See already EComHR, decision of 10 December 1977,Marckx v. Belgium.
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Protocol No. 1.32 This is a highly disputed issue, as benefits of this kind are often
completely funded by public means or through general taxation. The classifica-
tion of such benefits as "property" would clearly deviate from the traditional
understanding of the notion. Indeed, in the context of social security, property
could formerly only be found to exist if the individual himself had actually paid
for the benefits allowed.P In the case of Stec, the Court held that the distinction
between various funding methods had become increasingly artificial and that it
would be preferable to hold Article 1 applicable to all of these situations. Even
more important to the topic of this paper are the following considerations of the
Court:
"In the modern, democratic State, many individuals are, for all or part of their lives,
completely dependent for survival on social security and welfare benefits. Many domes-
tic legal systems recognise that such individuals require a degree ofcertainty and secu-
rity, and provide for benefits to be paid-subject to the fulfilment of the conditions of
eligibility-as ofright. Where an individual has an assertable right under domestic law
to a welfare benefit, the importance of that interest should also be reflected by holding
Article 1 ofProtocol No.1 to be applicable. ... Whilst the Convention sets forth what are
essentially civil and political rights, many of them have implications ofa social or eco-
nomic nature. The mere fact that an interpretation of the Convention may extend into
the sphere ofsocial and economic rights should not be a decisive factor against such an
interpretation; there is no water-tight division separating that sphere from the field cov-
ered by the Convention. "34
It is abundantly clear from these considerations that an evolutive and autono-
mous interpretation of the Convention may lead to a reduction of the importance
of the classic distinction between first and second-generation rights, and may lead
the Court to bring social and economic interests within the scope of the Conven-
tion. The same development is visible with respect to other Convention rights too,
such as the right to respect for one's private and family life. For example, the
Court recently decided in its judgment in Niedzwiecki that "[b]y granting child
benefits, States are able to demonstrate their respect for family life within the
meaning ofArticle 8 ofthe Convention; the benefits therefore come within the scope
of that provision".35 In its judgment in Sidabras and Dziautas, the Court even
recognised a right to access to private employment as part of the right to respect
for one's private life, even though this is traditionally a right that can be found in
international treaty instruments protecting social and economic nghts.l"
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Stec v. the United Kingdom, infra note 43.
ECtHR 16September 1996, Gaygusuz v. Austria, Reports 1996-IV, para. 39.
Id., para. 51, 52.
ECtHR 25 October 2005, Niedzwiecki v. Germany.
ECtHR 27 July 2004, Sidabras and Dziautas v. Lithuania, Reports 2004-VIII.
Intersentia 665
Chapter 7. Are Conflicting Rights Really an Issue?
Developments such as these are not only visible with respect to social rights
and interests, but they can also be noted in administrative law areas such as that
of state responsibility in planning policy cases. A relevant example is the case of
SCEA Ferme de Fresnoy, which concerned the limitation of the applicant's possi-
bilities for the exploitation of his property, for reason of the close proximity of two
buildings protected as monuments.'? The French authorities refused a number of
building permits as the planned buildings would harm the appearance of the
monuments. The Court regarded the refusal of the building permits and the lack
of compensation as an infringement of the applicant's right to property. Although
it is certainly not unreasonable to apply the right to property to cases such as this
one, to do so clearly blurs the difference between planning policy cases concern-
ing "normal" financial interests and cases where the classic right to property
really is at stake. Indeed, the reasoning contained in a case such as Ferme de
Fresnoy allows for many more cases concerning purely financial and economic
interests to be encompassed by the European Convention of Human Rights."
2.2.3. Conclusion
The preceding analysis of a number of cases decided by the ECtHR illustrates that
the classic distinction of civil and political rights on the one hand and social and
economic rights on the other has gradually lost part of its practical importance.P
Indeed, the Court recognised as early as 1979 (in its Airey decisionl.t" and
expressly confirmed in later cases (e.g. Stec) that the distinction is not always rel-
evant. The Court interprets the Convention rights in an evolutive and often
autonomous manner and it often imposes positive obligations on the States to
protect the Convention rights as effectively as possible. By doing so, it has fre-
quently stretched the scope of the various provisions to encompass a wide variety
of individual interests, which sometimes seem to be far removed from the actual
core of the protected rights. Purely financial, commercial, economic and social
interests are now protected by the right to property, while many environmental
and social interests are covered by the right to respect for one's private life, at least
when they have been severely affected. It may certainly be positively valued that
the ECtHR grants such strong legal protection to individual interests of so many
37
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ECtHR 1 December 2005, SCEA Ferme de Fresnoy v. France.
Cf e.g. ECtHR 11 October 2005, Anheuser-Busch v. Portugal, in which the ECtHR applied
Article 1 of Protocol No.1 to intellectual property in a case concerning purely commercial
interests of a multinational.
See also I.E. Koch, supra note 9, 408-409, mentioning that the Court is not entirely consistent
in its approach and giving various examples of cases in which the Court has refrained from
giving an extensive interpretation that would bring social or economic rights under the scope
of the Convention. While this is certainly true, it cannot detract from the general development
towards an extension of the scope of the rights that is visible in the Court's case law.
ECtHR 9 October 1979,Airey v. Ireland, Series A, Vol. 32, para. 26.
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kinds. Yet, as will be shown in section 3 of this paper, these developments also
entail practical difficulties, especially where (national) case law still attaches pro-
cedural value to the special character of fundamental rights.
2.3. THE EUROPEAN COURT OF JUSTICE
A proliferation of fundamental rights is also visible in the case law of the Euro-
pean Court of Justice. This may not be obvious at the outset, especially since it is
well known that the European Court of Justice has developed its case law regard-
ing fundamental rights only in a relatively late stage." It is clear, however, that the
ECJ strongly reacts to the decisions taken by the ECtHR, usually following the
Strasbourg Court's findings as regards interpretation and level ofprotection.V To
the extent that a development towards a widening of the scope of fundamental
rights is visible in Strasbourg, the case law of the Luxembourg Court will there-
fore usually show a parallel developmenr.P An analysis of the case law of the ECJ
would thus not seem to add very much to the analysis in the preceding section.
However, there is more to the fundamental rights case law ofthe European Court
ofJustice than the recognition ofcertain rights as fundamental principles ofcom-
munity law on the basis of the Strasbourg case law. To some extent, an autono-
mous development ofa proliferation of fundamental rights can be perceived, par-
ticularly where the importance and meaning of the economic principles
underlying the EC Treaty are concerned.
An excellent illustration ofthis development is provided by the case ofSchmid-
berger, decided by the ECJ in 2003.44 The case concerned the damage suffered by
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See e.g. F.G. Jacobs, Human Rights in the European Union: the Role of the Court of Iustice, 26
European Law Review, 331-341, 332 (2001) and M. Avbelj, European Court of Iustice and the
Question of Value Choices. Fundamental Human Rights as an Exception to the Freedom of
Movement of Goods, Jean Monnet Working Paper 06/04, 25 (2004) www.jeanmonnetpro-
gram.org/papers/04/040601.html (last accessed on November 5,2007).
Some good examples are ECJ 6 March 2001, Connolly Case C-274/99P, [2001] ECR 1-1575 and
ECJ 22 October 2002, Roquette Freres,Case C-94/00, [2002] ECR 9011.See also D. Spielmann,
Human Rights Case Law in the Strasbourg and Luxembourg Courts: Conflicts, Inconsisten-
cies, and Complementarities, in: P. Alston (ed.), The EU and Human Rights, 757-780, 777
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999).
See in particular D. Spielmann, supra note 42, 776. Interestingly, the ECJ sometimes goes even
further than the ECtHR does. An example may be found in the case law about pensions for
individuals who have undergone a gender transformation. The ECJ held that unequal pension
ages for women and men in this context constituted a prohibited discrimination under Euro-
pean law (ECJ 26 April 2006, Richards Case C-423/04, [2006] ECR 1-3585), whereas the ECtHR
accepted a difference in pensions based on age and gender as sufficiently justifiable (ECtHR 12
April 2006, Stec and Others v. the United Kingdom and cf. ECtHR 23 May 2006, Grant v. the
United Kingdom).
ECJ 12 June 2003, Schmidberger, Case C-112/00, [2003] ECR 1-5659. Particularly relevant is
also ECJ 14October 2004, Omega Spielhallen, Case C-36/02, [2004] ECR 1-96/09.
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a transport company as a result of a blockade of the Brenner motorway on the
border between Austria and Italy. The blockade was caused by a demonstration by
an environmental protection group, which was permitted by the Austrian author-
ities because of the group's freedom of assembly. Given the importance of the
decision, it is worthwhile to quote the relevant passages of the ECfs judgment in
full:
"76. In the present case, the national authorities relied on the need to respectfundamen-
tal rights guaranteed by both the ECHR and the Constitution of the Member State con-
cerned in deciding to allow a restriction to be imposed on one of the fundamental
freedoms enshrined in the Treaty.
77. The case thus raises the question of the need to reconcile the requirements of the
protection offundamental rights in the Community with those arising from a funda-
mental freedom enshrined in the Treaty and, more particularly, the question of the
respective scope of freedom of expression and freedom of assembly, guaranteed by
Articles 10 and 11 ofthe ECHR, and ofthe free movement ofgoods, where the former are
relied upon as justification for a restriction of the latter.
78. First, whilst the free movement ofgoods constitutes one of the fundamental princi-
ples in the scheme of the Treaty, it may, in certain circumstances, be subject to restric-
tions for the reasons laid down in Article 36 of that Treaty or for overriding require-
ments relating to the public interest, in accordance with the Court's consistent case-law
since the judgment in Case 120/78 Rewe-Zentral (Cassis de Dijon) [1979} ECR 649.
79. Second, whilst the fundamental rights at issue in the main proceedings are expressly
recognised by the ECHR and constitute the fundamental pillars ofa democratic society,
it nevertheless follows from the express wording ofparagraph 2 ofArticles 10 and 11 of
the Convention that freedom ofexpression and freedom ofassembly are also subject to
certain limitations justified by objectives in the public interest, in sofar as those deroga-
tions are in accordance with the law, motivated by one or more of the legitimate aims
under those provisions and necessary in a democratic society, that is to say justified by a
pressing social need and, in particular, proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued ....
80. Thus, unlike other fundamental rights enshrined in that Convention, such as the
right to life or the prohibition oftorture and inhuman or degrading treatment or punish-
ment, which admit ofno restriction, neither the freedom ofexpression nor the freedom
ofassembly guaranteed by the ECHR appears to be absolute but must be viewed in rela-
tion to its social purpose. Consequently, the exercise of those rights may be restricted,
provided that the restrictions in fact correspond to objectives ofgeneral interest and do
not, taking account of the aim ofthe restrictions, constitute disproportionate and unac-
ceptable interference, impairing the very substance of the rights guaranteed...
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81. In those circumstances, the interests involved must be weighed having regard to all
the circumstances of the case in order to determine whether a fair balance was struck
between those interests."
The Court's reasoning in Schmidberger is highly important to a proper under-
standing of the position of the notion of "fundamental rights" in the Community
context. It may be derived from it that the ECJplaces the "right" to free movement
of goods on the same level as the fundamental rights to peaceful assembly and
freedom of expression.P On a more abstract level, the judgment may thus be
understood as meaning that the four freedoms constitute "fundamental rights» as
much as civil and political rights do.46 This equalisation of the four freedoms with
fundamental rights is the more interesting as the freedoms are primarily eco-
nomic in character, having been created to guarantee free trade within the inter-
nal market in the first place.f" Thus, Schmidberger marks a development into the
equalisation of civil and political rights with economic and free trade rights and
interests.t"
Several other Community principles have equally developed from primarily
economic principles or concepts into fundamental rights. Particularly interesting
in this regard is the development of the prohibition of discrimination, especially
gender-based discrimination. It is well known that the principle of equal pay for
45
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The relevant passages have caused some controversy. According to some commentators, the
Court established that, as a general principle, fundamental rights prevail over fundamental
freedoms; see M.Avbelj, supra note 41, 49-50. Others have stated that no principled hierarchy
between fundamental rights and freedoms can be derived from the case, as the Court expressly
states that the requirements arising from the fundamental rights and those arising from a
fundamental freedom should be reconciled (see in particular J. Krzerniriska, Free Speech
Meets Free Movement-How Fundamental Really is 'Fundamental'? The Impact of Funda-
mental Rights on Internal Market Law, (3) ZERP Diskussionspapier 13, (2005), www.zerp.
uni-bremen.de/english/home.html, (last accessed at November 5, 2007)). The latter reading
seems to fit in best with the way the Court has presented its argumentation.
Of course, the Schmidberger case (Schmidberger, supra note 44) is not new in mentioning the
fundamental character of the four freedoms-there are many precedents in which this is
already said (see further M. Koskenniemi, The Effect of Rights on Political Culture, in: P.
Alston (ed.), The EU and Human Rights, 99-114, 106 (Oxford: OUP 1999)). The case is new,
however, to the extent that the classic fundamental right to assembly was directly invoked as a
justification of an impediment to free trade (as contrasted to invoking the right as part of an
accepted exception clause, such as public policy or public health), necessitating the Court to
define its position towards the issue of conflicting fundamental rights and freedoms. See in
particular A. Biondi, Free Trade, A Mountain Road and the Right to Protest: European Eco-
nomic Freedoms and Fundamental Individual Rights, 1 European Human Rights Law Review
51-61,57 (2004).
Although there seem to be different views on the precise aim of the free movement provisions,
as is explained well by M. Poiares Maduro, We, the Court. The European Court ofJustice & the
European Economic Constitution, 53 (Oxford: Hart, 1998).
Cf. A. Bogdandy, The European Union as a Human Rights Organization?, 37 Common Market
Law Review 1307,1326 (1997), M. Avbelj, supra note 41, and J. Krzeminska, supra note 45,5-6.
See in particular also M. Poiares Maduro, supra note 47, 167-168.
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men and women was inserted in the EEC Treaty because of economic reasons,
rather than fundamental ideas relating to the ideal of gender equality.t? However,
the ECJ soon came to acknowledge that the provisions concerning gender equal-
ity also had an important fundamental rights character.50 In its Schroder case
(2000), the ECJ even expressly accepted that the economic aim of preventing dis-
tortions of competition had grown to be secondary to the social aim of the prin-
ciple' i.e. the protection of the fundamental right to equality. 51 On the one hand,
this would seem to exemplify the gradual evolution of economic interests into
fundamental rights, which would underscore the thesis that a proliferation of
human rights can indeed be discerned in the Court's case law. On the other hand,
the express acknowledgement of the fundamental character of the principle of
equal pay may also be understood to imply that the Court still perceives a princi-
pled difference between human rights and economic interests, at least in the con-
text of equal treatment law.The situation is even more complex, however, since it
is still questionable whether the Court has really made a full shift towards the
recognition of equal treatment as a fundamental right rather than a purely eco-
nomic principle. Some recent judgments would seem to disclose that the Court is
still not always willing to provide a broad interpretation to fundamental equal
treatment principles, if such would negatively affect free trade and other economic
freedoms. 52 The fundamental character of the equality principle within Commu-
nity law can therefore still be doubted. The same is true for other fundamental
principles that have gradually been recognised by the ECJ. Some critics have even
stated that the ECJ does not protect fundamental rights for their own sake, but
uses them instrumentally to accelerate the process of legal integration of the
Community.53
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See C. Barnard, The Economic Objectives of Article 119,in: T.K. Hervey and D. O'Keeffe (eds.),
Sex Equality Law in the European Union 322-327 (Chichester: John Wiley & Sons, 1996). This
market-unifying role has been even more important with respect to the prohibition of nation-
ality discrimination-see e.g. G. More, The Principle of Equal Treatment: From Market-Uni-
fier to Fundamental Right?, in: P. Craig and G. de Burca (eds.), The Evolution ofEC Law 522
(Oxford: OUP 1999) and G. De Burca, The Role of Equality in European Community Law,in:
A. Dashwood and S. O'Leary (eds.), The Principle ofEqual Treatment in E.C. Law 6 (London:
Sweet & Maxwell 1997).
ECJ 8 April 1976,Defrenne v. Sabena, Case 43/95, [1976] ECR 455.
ECJ 10 February 2000, Schroder, Case C-50/96, [2000] ECR 1-743, para. 56-57.
See in particular ECJ 11July 2006, Sonia Chacon Navas, Case C-13/05, not yet published. It is
far from certain how the ECl's case law in this regard will develop. Some other recent judg-
ments, such as Mangold, would seem to indicate a more fundamental rights oriented approach;
see ECJ 22 November 2005, Mangold Case C-144/04, [2005] ECR 1-9981.
See e.g. J. Heliskoski, Fundamental Rights versus Economic Freedoms in the European Union:
Which Paradigm?, in: M. Koskenniemi, J. Petman and J.A.M. Klabbers (eds.), Nordic Cosmo-
politanism: Essays in International Law for Matti Koskenniemi, 417-443, 429 and 448/229 (Lei-
den: Nijhoff, 2003) and M. Koskenniemi, supra note 46, 107;see also in particular J. Coppel
and A. O'Neill, The European Court of Iustice: Taking Rights Seriously?', 29 Common Market
Law Review 669-692,670 (1992).
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More generally, it may be noted that economic principles and fundamental
rights cannot always be strictly separated in the ECrs case law. Over the years, the
European freedoms have lost part of their purely economic character and have
gained in political meaning. Poiares Maduro has argued, for example, that Arti-
cle 30 and the rules on free movement are essential instruments in the distribu-
tion of power within the constitutional order of the Union.54 In his view, the free
movement rules are so closely connected to the constitution of the ECfEU that
they have acquired a character that is comparable to that of democracy-related
fundamental rights. The result of this analysis would be that the free movement
provisions and economic principles underlying the European treaties should be
regarded by now as political fundamental rights, rather than purely economic
rights.55 The relatively recent inclusion ofthe freedom ofmovement and residence
of EU citizens as a "citizen's right" in the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights,
would seem to confirm this view.56
If Maduro's analysis is correct, it is questionable whether one could really
speak about a proliferation of fundamental rights in the European context, in the
sense that all kinds of economic and social interests are increasingly recognised
as fundamental in character. After all, in this reading, the four freedoms should
be regarded as new political and civil rights, rather than as enforceable economic
and financial interests. The scope of the rights would then perhaps be somewhat
wider than before, but the newly recognised aspects belong to the very core of
these rights, rather than the periphery. Nonetheless, it is questionable whether
this analysis may be used to prove that no real extension of the scope of funda-
mental rights is visible in the EU. Regardless oftheir important political function,
the four European freedoms remain primarily economic and financial in nature
and they have little to do with the core aspects of fundamental rights, such as
democracy, individual autonomy and human dignity. Moreover, the four freedoms
and principles hardly seem to offer enforceable rights to individual persons,
except perhaps for the freedom of movement. To the contrary, the four freedoms
primarily represent certain public interests (such as the interests of interstate
trade), or to the most protect the financial interests of enterprises and companies
(such as the applicant company in the Schmidberger case discussed above). As a
result, they can still be separated from human rights.
The position and meaning of fundamental rights within the case law of the
ECT are thus not very clear. It may not be surprising that Hepple has critically
stated that "the normative hierarchy of national constitutional rights, interna-
tional and European conventions of human rights, and the economic freedoms
54
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M. Poiares Maduro, supra note 47, 167.
Id.,168.
Article 45 forms part of Chapter 5, "Citizen's rights", which also contains such rights as the
right to vote and the right to petition.
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which form the foundation of the Community) has become confused and
ambiguous.P? Some proliferation of fundamental rights may certainly be per-
ceived) regardless of the interpretation of the four freedoms and regardless of the
ECfs analysis and application of the various fundamental rights. It has been
pointed out already that the ECT has been willing to follow suit of the ECtHR)s
case law where the interpretation of Convention rights is concerned.58 Ifan exten-
sion of the scope of these rights is visible in the Strasbourg context) it will be
reflected in the Luxembourg case law) albeit sometimes in a more economically
tinted fashion. Furthermore, the lack of clarity as to the precise meaning of the
European notion of fundamental rights already indicates that it is difficult to dis-
tinguish clearly between fundamental rights, individual economic and social
interests, and societal economic interests. To the extent that the ECT has marked
certain individual and societal economic interests as "fundamental", this may
certainly be regarded as a sign of the proliferation of classic fundamental rights.
3. JUDICIAL ASSESSMENT OF CASES CONCERNING
FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS AND OTHER
INDIVIDUAL INTERESTS
3.1. INTRODUCTION
Where fundamental rights have been codified, for example in international trea-
ties or national constitutions, it is to some extent logical that a difference is made
between fundamental rights and individual interests. After all, the applicability
of the relevant constitutional or treaty provisions and, consequently, the applica-
bility of a set of assessment criteria connected to the provisions is determined by
the classification of an individual interest as a fundamental right. With the Euro-
pean Court of Human Rights, the applicability of a Convention provision even
determines its competence to consider an individual application. Ifthe individual
claim cannot be brought under one of the fundamental rights contained in the
Convention, the application does not concern a «violation ofthe rights set forth in
the Convention" as intended in Article 34 of the Convention, and it will be
declared inadmissible by the Court. The difference between "fundamental rights"
(as protected by the Convention or a national constitution or national legislation)
and other individual interests thus appears to be of clear practical relevance and
importance. However) even though there is some force in the distinction, it is not
pertinent to all cases. Much depends on the organisation of the legal system and
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B. Hepple, Social Values and European Law,48 Current LegalProblems39, 46 (1995), cf also J.
Krzeminska, supra note 45, 6.
Cf e.g. M. Koskenniemi, supra note 46, 106-107.
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the competences of the judiciary. In most national legal systems, and also in a
supranational system such as that of the EU, at least some examples may be given
of situations where there is less reason to distinguish between fundamental rights
cases and cases concerning other individual interests. This is particularly true for
cases with an administrative law character, i.e. cases brought against a public
authority because of its alleged responsibility for an infringement ofan individual
interest. Such cases frequently concern conflicts of rights or (public or individual)
interests. In some administrative law cases, even a true and direct conflict between
fundamental rights will be at stake, for example because the legislature or a public
authority has adopted a measure to protect "core" fundamental rights, but which
results in an infringement of fundamental rights of others. An important exam-
ple from the case law of the ECtHR is the case of Evans,which concerned a statu-
tory rule in the UK to the effect that both interested parties in IVF treatment were
allowed to withdraw their consent at any time before the embryos were used. 59 In
the case at hand, Ms Evans' partner withdrew his consent when their relationship
ended, while IVF treatment with the fertilised embryos would have been the only
chance for Ms Evans to have children of her own. Hence, thelegislative rule had
the result of protecting the interest ofMs Evans' partner not to become the father
of her children, to the disadvantage of the interests of Ms Evans. In the legal pro-
ceedings following the withdrawal of consent, Ms Evans sought a declaration of
incompatibility under the English Human Rights Act 1998 (HRA), alleging that
the act breached her rights under the HRA. The case thus clearly concerned a
conflict between the rights and interests of two individuals, which actually arose
within a horizontal legal relationship. Yet, Ms Evans did not bring a case against
her former partner, who was directly responsible for the harm done to her, but she
directed a complaint against the legislation governing the conflict. The example
of Evans may thus serve to illustrate that many cases concerning conflicts ofrights
are actually "vertical" in character, concerning the relation between the govern-
ment and the individual rather than the relation between two private individuals.
As the following sections will demonstrate, it is precisely in such vertical relation-
ships that a distinction is often made between fundamental rights and other indi-
vidual interests, and it is precisely here that the value of the distinction is open to
doubt.
In this section, some insight will be given into the legal situation in the UK
and the Netherlands, where an abundance of case law and legal scholarship is
available concerning the distinction between fundamental rights and individual
interests (section 3.2). Subsequently, the approach taken by the European Court
of Justice will be considered (section 3.3). It is the more interesting to do so as the
ECJ does not have to deal with specific constitutional protection for fundamental
59 ECtHR 7 March 2006 (Chamber Judgment), Evans v. The United Kingdom.
Intersentia 673
Chapter 7. Are Conflicting Rights Really an Issue?
rights alone, which means that it has had significant opportunities to consider the
relevance of distinguishing between fundamental rights and other interests.
3.2. NATIONAL COURTS: THE EXAMPLE OF THE UNITED
KINGDOM AND THE NETHERLANDS
3.2.1. The UK
In the UK, a well-established distinction is made between judicial review in fun-
damental rights cases and other cases concerning acts by public authorities. The
distinction finds its basis in the perceived availability or lack of legal standards to
decide such cases. This is made clear, for example, by De Burca, who has argued
that decisions taken by public authorities normally imply a political choice, i.e. a
choice not "involving any 'legal' standard upon which a court could or should
decide". Such political choices must be made by the elected body or a public
authority in the first place. This is different, De Burca contends, if a decision
affects an individual fundamental right:
"... [T]he protection for certain recognized interests-generally those such as tradition-
ally protected civil liberties and human rights, and other legally acknowledged values
and interests-is generally categorized as a judicial task, something which a non-elected
body free from the varying political influences of the moment is best placed to
ensure. ''60
This understanding of the justiciability of fundamental rights, as contrasted with
other interests, also finds clear expression in the administrative case law. Gener-
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G. De Burca, supra note 1, 107. Cf also P.Craig, Administrative Law, 4th ed. 592 (London: Sweet
& Maxwell 1999), stating the following reason for the application of a proportionality test in
fundamental rights cases: "Ifwe recognize certain interests as being ofparticular importance,
and categorise them as fundamental rights, then this renders the application ofproportionality
necessary or natural, and easier... The reason why this is so is that a difficult aspect of the pro-
portionality calculus has already been resolved: one of the interests, such as freedom ofspeech,
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that fundamental rights increasingly seem to cover individual interests which are primarily
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ting such a test if the administrative action has affected a different interest. Craig seems to
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cases concerning the application of the Human Rights Act, and the nature of the test which is
to be applied should not differ radically depending upon which side of the borderline a case is
said to fall.
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ally, a so-called test of"Wednesbury unreasonableness» is applied to acts ofpublic
authorities that infringe individual interests.s' According to this test, administra-
tive action will only be unlawful if it is irrational, which means that if it "is so
unreasonable that no reasonable authority could ever have come to it, then the
courts can interfere/v- This (rather circular) definition discloses that the courts
will generally defer to the public authorities-the standard ofunreasonableness is
generally pitched very high.63 An administrative act really must be absurd or
"arbitrary and capricious» before it will be struck down by an English court.s"
Indeed, Lord Greene mentioned in Wednesbury, ((... to prove a case of that kind
would require something overwhelming... ".
The application of this test to administrative action has important conse-
quences for the choice of standards and the burden ofproof. The Wednesbury test
places the burden on the individual challenging the administrative act to demon-
strate that it is substantively unreasonable.s'' Furthermore, it implies that no spe-
cific test of proportionality will be applied.v" Such a test is common in Commu-
nity law and the case law of the European Court of Human Rights and requires
that the courts examine whether an interference is suitable and necessary to
achieve a certain legitimate aim, and if the administrative decision reflects a
reasonable balance ofinterests.67 According to English case law, the application of
a test of proportionality would mean that a court would have to consider the
relative weight accorded to a variety of interests and considerations, assess the
balance of the various interests involved in the decision and judge whether the
administrative action was really necessary/" The courts are not considered to be
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
Cf W. Wade and C. Forsyth, Administrative Law, 9th ed. 353-354 (Oxford: OUP, 2004).
Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd v. Wednesbury Corporation [1948] 1 K.B. 223 at 233.
A more revealing formulation of the test has been given by Lord Diplock, who held that the test
ofWednesbury unreasonableness ce••• applies to a decision which is so outrageous in its defiance
of logic or ofaccepted moral standards that no sensible person who had applied his mind to the
question to be decided could have arrived at it." (Council ofCivil Service Unions v. Minister for
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authority" (Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd v. Wednesbury Corporation [1948] 1 K.B.
223 per Lord Greene).
W. Wade and C. Forsyth, supra note 61, 364.
W. Wade and C. Forsyth, supra note 61, 354.
R. v. Secretary of State for Trade and Industry, ex parte Lonrho Pic [1989] 1 WLR 525 at
539H-540B and see M. Fordham and T. De la Mare, Identifying the Principles of Proportional-
ity, in: J. Iowell and J. Cooper (eds.), Understanding Human Rights Principles 27-89,32 (Oxford/
Portland: Hart 2001).
W. Wade and C. Forsyth, supra note 61,366.
See e.g. J. Rivers, Proportionality and Variable Intensity of Review, 65 Cambridge Law Journal
174-201, 178 (2006).
See R. v. Secretary ofState for the Home Department, ex parte Daly [2001] UKHL 28 per Lord
Steyn (para. 27), R. v. Secretary ofState for the Home Department, ex parte Brind [1991] 1 A.C.
696 and R. v. Chief Constable ofSussex ex parte International Trader's Ferry Ltd. [1999] 2 AC
418 per Lord Slynn. See also G. Wong, Towards the Nutcracker Principle: Reconsidering the
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sufficiently equipped to apply such an exacting test, which might even require
them to substitute their own judgment for that of the administrative authority.s?
Instead, the courts generally only assess the reasonableness of the act as a whole,
on the basis of such formulae as have been quoted above. As a result, the test of
Wednesbury unreasonableness is notoriously weak in its intensity of review, which
means that only few administrative decisions harming individual interests will be
held to be unacceptable.?"
This is all very different for cases in which the Human Rights Act (HRA)
applies. This Act was introduced in 1998 to incorporate the European Convention
of Human Rights in national law and, consequently, contains virtually identical
rights as the Convention does. It appears from the legislative history of the HRA
that the Act will be interpreted and applied in a way that is consistent with the
case law of the European Court of Human Rights, including an application of the
various tests and standards developed by the Court." Admittedly, the HRA test
is often applied quite deferentially, producing the same results as Wednesbury
unreasonableness would have done.P Review under the HRA is different, how-
ever, to the extent that it is often up to the government to prove the reasonableness
of the interference.P Moreover, the HRA test is carefully subdivided in different
parts to enable the court to judge various aspects of the interference and its
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Objections to Proportionality, 2000 Public Law 92-109,94 and W. Wade and C. Forsyth, supra
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R. v. Secretary ofState for the Home Department, ex parte Brind [1991] 1 A.C. 696, 61O,perLord
Lowry.
Cf M. Fordham and T. De la Mare, supra note 65, p. 32. This must be nuanced, however, to the
extent that some variation in the intensity of review is visible (in particular in cases concerning
fundamental rights before the HRA entered into force) and the threshold is sometimes pitched
less high. On this, see P. Craig, supra note 60, 582-583. In general, however, the test is applied
in a rather deferential manner.
See Lord Irvine ofLairg, The Development of Human Rights in Britain under an Incorporated
Convention on Human Rights [1998] Public Law 221,229,232; also G. Wong, supra note 68, 95,
indicating that application of the test of proportionality is now also visible in the case law.
W. Wade and C. Forsyth, supra note 61, 368. The English test was severely criticised for that
reason by the ECtHR, which held that the test applied would not constitute an "effective rem-
edy" for the applicant in the sense of Article 13 of the Convention, as the threshold is (c ••• placed
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the infringement of the applicants' rights answered a pressing social need or was proportionate
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Smith and Grady v. the United Kingdom, Reports 1999-VI, para. 137).
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proporttonality.?" For this reason, the HRA test is more elaborate, and it is usually
more favourable to the individual than the Wednesbury test is.75
Interestingly, scholars in the United Kingdom have demonstrated that the
HRA test is now applied in many cases where formerly Wednesbury unreasona-
bleness would have been chosen.Z" Perhaps partly because of this, the marked
difference between Wednesbury unreasonableness review and the HRA test has
caused intense debate on the question whether a more elaborate set of criteria (in
particular a tripartite test of proportionality) should also be applied to adminis-
trative law cases where no fundamental rights are at stake. The reason for some
scholars to favour such an approach lies precisely in the illogical distinction that
is presently made between cases concerning fundamental rights and cases con-
cerning administrative conduct falling outside this area-the distinction is
termed "arbitrary" and "artificial" and is arguably founded on no principled con-
sideration at all.77 Even some Law Lords have pleaded for a more general applica-
tion of the proportionality test-Lord Slynn, for example, stated that "trying to
keep the Wednesbury principle and proportionality in separate compartments
seems to me to be unnecessary and confusing."78 This view is held ever more
widely, and support to retain the distinction between Wednesbury unreasonable-
ness and the HRA test of proportionality seems to be decreastng."
These developments would seem to underscore our thesis that there is, in
practice, no good reason to apply radically different legal standards to cases con-
cerning "normal" individual interests than to cases dealing with "real" funda-
mental rights. There might be good cause, of course, to opt for variable intensity
in the application of such standards. After all, the proportionality test can be
applied very strictly, indeed requiring some judicial activism, yet it can also be
applied rather deferentially, as is sometimes done by the ECtHR.80 According to
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supra note 60,585; Lord Irvine of Hairg, supra note 71, 234. See also.R. v. Secretary ofState for
the Home Department, ex parte Daly, supra note 65, para. 27.
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P. Craig, supra note 60, 99.
In particular G. Wong, supra note 68,96.
R. (Alcon bury Development Ltd.) v. Secretary of State for the Environment, Transport and the
Regions [2001]2 WLR 1389,para. 51.Cf also Lord Irving ofHairg, supra note 71, 234 and Lord
Steyn, 2000-2005: Laying the Foundations of Human Rights Law in the United Kingdom, 4
European Human Rights Law Review 349-362, 358 (2005), (stating that it is possible that the
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of the 1998 Act).
See W. Wade and C. Forsyth, supra note 61,371. In 1999, Craig even tentatively predicted that
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Craig supra note 60, 598).
Cf P. Craig, The Courts, the Human Rights Act and Judicial Review,117Law Quarterly Review
589-603,596 (2001) and J. Rivers supra note 67, 202; see also. v. Secretary ofState for the Home
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many scholars, if such a variable approach were favoured, proportionality might
also be applied outside the specific context of HRA cases.
3.2.2 TheNetherlands
Just like the English courts, Dutch administrative courts usually distinguish
clearly between cases concerning "normal" individual interests, and cases con-
cerning fundamental rights. As a matter of principle, the Dutch administrative
courts show strong deference to public authorities that have been accorded dis-
cretionary powers. The reason for this is the desire to respect the constitutional
position of the administrative bodies and prevent a situation whereby the courts
would substitute their judgment for that of the administration." In its important
Maxis-Praxis decision, the Administrative Law Division of the Council of State,
one of the three administrative high courts in the Netherlands, stated that an
administrative decision may only be annulled if the case discloses such manifest
unfairness in the weighing of interests, that no reasonable authority could have
taken the contested decision.V This test is usually referred to as a negative test of
reasonableness ("niet onredelijk") or a prohibition of arbitrariness ("verbod van
willekeur"), and it only demands a very low intensity of review to be applied. For
this reason, the test is also often termed "marginal review" ("marginale
toetsing").83
The choice for marginal review frequently results in a lack of sound judicial
reasoning. In many cases, it is difficult to grasp the grounds which have led the
administrative court to hold that the contested decision was "not unreasonable". 84
Furthermore, the Dutch administrative courts only rarely apply the principle of
proportionality and its elements of suitability, necessity and proportionality in
the strict sense. Although elements ofproportionality are sometimes mentioned-
such as the necessity of a certain measure or its suitability-the test is usually
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Department, ex parte Daly [2001] UKHL 28 per Lord Steyn, para. 28.
Administrative Law Division (Afdeling Bestuursrechtspraak), decision of 9 May 1996, lurispru-
den tie Bestuursrecht 1996/158 ("MaXis-Praxis"). See also J.Schwarze, European Administrative
Law, Revised 1st ed. 701 (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2006).
Administrative Law Division (Afdeling Bestuursrechtspraak), decision of 9 May 1996, lurispru-
dentie Bestuursrecht 1996/158. See also Administrative Law Division (Afdeling Bestuursrecht-
spraak), decision of20 July 2005, LJN-number: AT970 (see www.rechtspraak.nl).
An overview of the meaning of the various terms has been given by RW.N. De Waard, Margi-
nale toetsing en evenredigheid, in: Getuigend Staatsrecht. Liber Amicorum A.K. Koekkoek),
363-377,368 (Nijmegen: Wolf, 2005) (in Dutch).
See (in Dutch) e.g. I.e. Van der Vlies, Kwantum-belangenafweging, 1997 Ars Aequi 46, 46-47
and J.H. Gerards, Het evenredigheidsbeginsel van art. 3:4 lid 2 Awb en het Europese recht, in:
T. Barkhuysen, W. Den Ouden and E. Steyger, Europees Recht Effectueren 73-113, 99 (Alphen
aId Rijn: Kluwer 2007).
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restricted to a very general review of the contested measure or decision.P Finally,
marginal review implies that the onus is on the individual to demonstrate the
unreasonableness of the administrative decision or measure.s" Since many indi-
vidual complainants find it difficult to do so, the chances of success for individual
litigants are mostly fairly low.87
Ifone of the fundamental rights contained in the ECHR has been invoked, the
situation is very different." In that situation, the administrative courts will test
the facts of the case against the standards and criteria for review as developed by
the European Court of Human Rights.s? This usually means that a tripartite test
of proportionality is applied, rather than a general test of unreasonableness. This
almost automatically results in more detailed and elaborate judicial reasoning.
After all, all three elements ofthe test ofproportionality then have to be addressed
separately, which means that it is necessary for the courts to pay attention to such
factors as suitability and necessity of the decision to obtain the aim pursued, and
the balance of interests that has been struck by the public authority. Moreover, in
cases concerning fundamental rights, it is up to the government to demonstrate
that the interference is justified and that all standards for reasonableness have
been met.
Perhaps somewhat surprisingly, the application of the Convention standards
does not necessarily entail a higher level of intensity of review. This is witnessed
by an important Dutch case concerning pig farmers.?" Their interests were harmed
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J.H Gerards, supra note 84, 100.This is different in cases where European law is invoked, since
the ECJ test of proportionality is then duly applied by the courts; see e.g. The Netherlands,
Supreme Court (Hoge Raad) 15 December 1998, Nederlandse lurisprudentie 1999/553. See in
particular on this, J.H. [ans et al, Inleiding tot het Europees bestuursrecht 197 (Nijmegen: Ars
Aequi Libri, 2002) and, for an overview in English, J. Schwarze, supra note 81, 70l.
Y.E.Schuurmans, Bewijslastverdeling in het bestuursrecht. Zorgvuldigheid en bewijsvoering bij
beschikkingen 120 (Deventer: Kluwer 2005).
E.g. A.Q.C. Tak, Rechters met slappe knieen, 2002(20) Nederlands furistenblad.
It may be mentioned here that there is no statutory act similar to the UK Human Rights Act
1998 in the Netherlands. A number of human rights (both civil/political and social/economic
rights) have been laid down in the Dutch Constitution, but Article 120 of the Constitution
prohibits the Dutch courts from constitutional review of legislation. Articles 93 and 94 of the
Constitution, however, stipulate that Dutch legislation will not be applicable if it is in conflict
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test statutory regulations against provisions of the ECHR or the ICCPR, and they do so rather
often. Thus, the ECHR and the ICCPR constitute a primary source oflaw to the judiciary in the
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gants in proceedings which do not so much concern statutory regulations as individual deci-
sions by public authorities. See for an overview in English of the relevant case law and litera-
ture, L.F.M. Besselink 2004, Constitutional Law of the Netherlands (Nijmegen: Ars Aequi
2004), Chapter 5 and 7.
J.H. Gerards, Rechterlijke belangenafweging in het publiekrecht, 2006(4) Rechtsgeleerd Maga-
zijn 1hemis 147-159, 149.
The Netherlands, Supreme Court (Hoge Raad) 16November 2001,lurisprudentie Bestuursrecht
2002, No.2.
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by statutory rules about the number of pigs a farmer was allowed to keep ("pig
rights"-"varkensrechten") in order to reduce manure levels. The rules included a
strong overall reduction of the pig rights allotted to each farmer, which negatively
affected the pecuniary position of a large group of farmers. The farmers alleged
that the regulations interfered with their right to property as protected by Arti-
cle 1 of Protocol No.1 to the ECHR, an argument that was accepted by the Dutch
courts. As a result, the courts had to investigate whether the regulations had
struck a fair balance between the various interests involved, as is required by the
case law of the ECtHR. The Dutch Supreme Court (Hoge Raad) stated, however,
that the legislature should be allowed a large measure of discretion in regulating
this complex socio-economic field. The presence of a fair balance should not be
strictly scrutinised and some form of marginal review should be applied instead.
The result of the test applied by the Supreme Court thus did not differ much from
the outcome that would have been reached by the application of the normal test of
unreasonableness. Yet, the Supreme Court's judgment clearly differed from many
regular administrative law judgments, to the extent that its reasoning was much
more elaborate. The Supreme Court scrupulously detected and defined the vari-
ous relevant interests and it investigated the balance that had been struck between
them rather closely. In addition, it not only applied an abstract review of the stat-
utory act at hand, but it also investigated whether sufficient attention had been
paid by the legislature to individual cases in which the regulations might cause
extreme hardship.?'
The pig rights case would seem to demonstrate two different things. Firstly, it
makes clear that the applicability of a fundamental right really makes a difference
to the set of criteria applied by the Dutch courts and the quality of their reason-
ing. Secondly, it shows that there is little substantive difference between the inter-
est at stake in a case such as this one (i.e. a pecuniary interest protected by the
right to property) and other social or economic interests, and, as a result, between
the outcomes reached by the application of two distinct sets of standards. It might
be expected that cases such as this one would have triggered some debate about
the appropriateness of certain standards of review and the difference between
interests and fundamental rights, along the lines visible in the United Kingdom.
Remarkably enough, no such debate has developed as yet. To the contrary, distin-
guished scholars have recently stressed the continuing relevance of the distinc-
tion between cases concerning fundamental rights and cases coming purely under
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See further on this (in Dutch) the case comments by L.F.M. Verhey, Verbod van constitu-
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administrative law.92 Their main argument in this regard is that fundamental
rights cases can usually be decided on purely legal grounds, whereas typical
administrative law cases require political or policy judgments to be made.f" In the
Netherlands, therefore, fundamental rights will continue to be regarded as a spe-
cial category, warranting the application of different standards of review.
3.3. THE EUROPEAN COURT OF JUSTICE
Finally, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) has adopted a different approach in
assessing interferences with fundamental rights and interests. In almost all of its
cases, whether concerning fundamental rights or not, the ECJ will apply a test of
proportionality, usually consisting of at least a test of suitability and necessity."
Unlike the courts in the two national legal systems discussed above, the ECJ does
not show any variation in the standards for review between cases concerning fun-
damental rights and cases concerning other interests. Nonetheless, some differ-
ence is visible, namely with respect to the intensity with which the test of propor-
tionality is applied.?" The ECJ generally opts for very marginal review in cases
where the Community institutions have wide discretionary powers, especially if
they have to act in an area which entails political, economic and social choices
and in which they are called upon to undertake complex assessments." In these
cases, the ECl's deferential position may be explained by a combination of respect
for the discretionary powers of Community institutions and a lack of expertise.
Consequently, the ECJ will only intervene if a decision or measure is "manifestly
inappropriate"97 or if it is apparent that the relevant institution "manifestly
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Intersentia 681
Chapter 7. Are Conflicting Rights Really an Issue?
exceeded the bounds of its discretion't'" In this context, the ECJ is inclined to
show particular restraint if no Community interests have been harmed (such as
the four freedoms), but merely national or individual economic interests have
been affected.'? For all of these cases, it has been concluded that applicants will
find it difficult to convince the EeJ that a measure is manifestly disproportion-
ate.100
The ECJalso shows restraint in the situation where a Community interest has
been harmed by Member State action, but where the action was meant to realise
goals on which there is no clear European consensus, or where the primary power
for regulation lies with the national authorities.WI This will be the case, for exam-
ple, if a national government tries to justify a restriction of trade by reasons of
public policy,as happened in the case of Omega SpielhallenP? The case concerned
a German prohibition on laser games, which was considered necessary to protect
human dignity. The resulting German interpretation of the notion of "public pol-
icy" is not widely supported by other Member States, yet the ECJ held that the
national authorities had a margin of discretion to determine if their conception of
public policy necessitated restrictive measures.F"
In cases such as Omega Spielhallen, the EeJ will apply a rather marginal type
of review, although it will often pay close attention to the evidence brought
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Id., in particular para. 31 and 37-39. See also ECJ 24 March 1994 Schindler, Case C-275/92,
[1994] ECR 1-1039, para. 61 and ECJ 21 September 1999 Lddra, Case C-124/97, [1999] ECR
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too, such as that of public health. See e.g. ECJ 28 September 2006 Ahokainen and Leppik, Case
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State has taken certain measures in accordance with the precautionary principle, i.e. where it
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Intersentia
Fundamental Rights and Other Interests - Should It Really Make a Difference?
forward by the parties and provide well-reasoned decisions. Restraint and defer-
ence thus have a somewhat divergent result in the EU context than is visible with
the courts in the UK and the Netherlands-the main similarity being the stand-
ard of review and the intensity thereof.
The ECT generally applies a far stricter test in other types of cases. In particu-
lar, the ECT pays closer attention in cases concerning interferences with individ-
ual rights which it has found to belong to the fundamental principles of Commu-
nity law, especially if the interference is considered a serious one.104 Different
from the case law in national systems such as the Netherlands and the UK, this
rule of intensification is not clear-cut. The sole fact that a fundamental right has
been affected does not necessarily result in stricter scrutiny-especially in cases
concerning property rights, the ECT would often seem to apply a rather general
test which does not differ much from that applied with respect to other inter-
ests.IOS In this regard, the ECT's equal treatment case law is clearly of interest. In
section 2, it has been shown that the Community principle of equal treatment has
gradually evolved from a primarily economic interest into a classic human right.
However, perhaps surprisingly, this does not seem to have brought about a real
change in the assessment of equal treatment cases. This is understandable as far
as cases about nationality discrimination are concerned, as they have alwaysbeen
subjected to stricter scrutiny because of the fundamental value of free trade within
the internal market.l'" Further intensification of the test would seem to be hardly
possible here. As regards gender discrimination, the situation is different. Yet, the
ECT's position is ambiguous. Sometimes the ECT applies a relatively strict test
(which would be in accordance with the fundamental value of the notion of gen-
der equality), whereas in other cases (e.g. cases concerning social security), it opts
for a deferential position vis-a-vis the national authorities and applies a general
104
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erty did not amount to a disproportionate and intolerable interference, impairing the very
substance of the right (para. 149 and 153).The result was a relatively low intensity of review,
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test of reasonableness.l'" Also with regard to other grounds of discrimination,
such as age, the EC] has made clear that the Member States enjoy a certain margin
of discretion. lOS The classification of equality as a fundamental individual right
thus seems to have been of limited consequence to the intensity of the ECl's
review. In fact, the opposite seems to be true: if the equality principle is not so
much invoked as a fundamental right, as in its function as a principle supporting
and facilitating the internal market, the ECl's test generally seems to be stricter
and more elaborate. Indeed, it transpires from the ECl's case law that rigorous
scrutiny is usually applied with respect to interferences with one of the four
freedoms, which, as demonstrated in section 2.3, the EC] has consistently termed
fundamental rights or principles.l?" In cases concerning restrictive trade meas-
ures or decisions, the EC] requires that they be justified by "overriding social
interests", thus setting high standards for the demonstration of proportionali-
ty.IIO The EC] obviously will accept such measures less easily, regardless of whether
they also affect individual fundamental rights.
Thus, the ECl's case law does not really disclose a principled distinction
between fundamental rights and other interests as regards the choice for its
methods of assessment and its intensity of review. Rather, it seems to pay close
attention to such factors as the presence of discretionary powers or the harm that
is done to fundamental Community interests such as the four freedoms and
107
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unhampered interstate trade. Indeed, the intensity of the ECl's test of proportion-
ality seems to depend on a complex interaction between a variety of factors, which
may differ for each individual case.III
3.4. CONCLUSION
In this section, an overview has been provided of the way in which the courts in
three different legal systems deal with the distinction between fundamental rights
and other individual interests. All of these courts have the power to decide cases
of both types, and they all have the possibility freely to vary the intensity of their
scrutiny and the standards of review according to the type of case before them. As
has been demonstrated, the courts in both the United Kingdom and the Nether-
lands clearly distinguish between «regular" administrative law cases and cases
concerning fundamental rights. In the latter type of case, a more elaborate test is
carried out and the national courts' reasoning is usually more detailed and spe-
cific, even though the level of intensity is not always high. In the former type of
case, a general test of arbitrariness or manifest unreasonableness is applied, which
has its effects for the burden of proof, the application of the test ofproportionality
and the level of detail of the statement of grounds for the judgment. Remarkably
enough, the distinction is still considered fully reasonable and acceptable in the
Netherlands, whereas there seems to be considerable debate on the issue in the
United Kingdom.
The ECl's case law shows a completely different picture. No principled distinc-
tion between fundamental rights and other interests is discernible here. Instead,
the ECT bases its intensity of review and its methods of assessment on the sub-
stance of the interests at stake and on the way in which administrative and legisla-
tive powers have been defined. As a consequence, the ECl's case law is somewhat
less transparent-it is sometimes difficult to trace the exact reason for a certain
level of review or set of standards in its judgments. On the other hand, the
approach has the advantage that less attention is paid to the label of fundamental
rights. Also, the methods ofassessment are usually closely fitted to the substance
of the interests at stake. Indeed, this raises the question whether it would not be
possible and desirable for other courts to adopt the Eel's approach, at least to the
extent that they are able to decide freely on their own standards ofassessment and
intensity of review. It is this question that that will be addressed in section 4.
111 See G. De Burca, supranote 1, 147, where she gives an overview of relevant factors.
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4. THE LEGAL DISTINCTION BETWEEN
FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS AND INDIVIDUAL
INTERESTS - IS THERE AN ALTERNATIVE?
The discussion of the proliferation of fundamental rights in section 2 reveals that
many individual interests currently qualify as fundamental rights. Indeed,
because of the extension of the scope of enforceable fundamental rights, it has
become increasingly difficult to define an individual interest as a right or "merely"
as an interest. This again raises the question whether it is justifiable to uphold the
still existing differences in the judicial methods and intensity of review applied in
cases concerning one or the other type of interest.
Before this question is addressed in more detail, it should be stressed that the
concept of fundamental rights (or human rights) is of enormous importance to
society. Human rights policies and adjudication are dearly needed to guarantee
individual freedom and equality, in western societies as much as elsewhere. The
simple fact that the proliferation of fundamental rights has given rise to a certain
debasement of the currency of such rights,l12 should not be regarded as a reason
to throw overboard the entire concept of fundamental (or human) rights, or
degrade the value of the moral claims on which such rights are based. The thesis
submitted in this paper certainly does not tend to the abolition of the concept of
fundamental rights. It is argued, however, that to the extent that it has become
increasingly difficult to distinguish between fundamental rights and other indi-
vidual interests, the distinction between the two categories is artificial and should
not be used as the determinative factor in judicial decision-making. In cases con-
cerning conflicts between rights and interests, this means that courts should not
automatically attach special weight to individual interests qualifying as "funda-
mental rights", as compared to other individual interests.
There is the more reason to raise this issue, because a further rise of "border-
line cases') is to be expected in the future. In academic literature, an increase is
expected in the acceptance of new fundamental rights, reflecting novel aspects of
various conditions of human life relating to food, environment, and resulting
from technological advances in mass communications, information technology,
and reproductive techniques.U" It is highly probable that these future develop-
ments will even further soften the borderline between fundamental rights and
what are currently called "individual interests", especially in the field of social,
economic and cultural rights. Good reason may be found in this to reconsider the
procedural and substantive distinctions that are still often made in adjudication.
The discussion in section 3 has shown that the invocation of a fundamental right
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often forms a simple trigger for the courts to apply an elaborate, sophisticated and
rather strict test ofjustification, while they adopt a highly relaxed and deferential
approach as soon as a "mere" individual interest is at stake. It has also been shown
that the distinction is sometimes hardly avoidable because of the presence oflegal
or procedural restraints-such is the case, for example, for the ECtHR, which will
simply not have jurisdiction if no fundamental right is at stake. Ifthere is any pos-
sibility for change ofjudicial method, however, it seems to be appropriate to make
use of it to reduce the discrepancy in legal standards and intensity of review.
In this regard, it is important to note that the case law discussed in section 3
shows little substantive difference as to the methods used to deal with fundamen-
tal rights and fundamental interests. It is relevant here to recall a remark by
Koskenniemi that the "identification, meaning and applicability of rights are
dependent on contextual assessments of 'proportionality' or administrative 'bal-
ancing' through which priorities are set among conflicting conceptions of politi-
cal value and scarce resources are distributed between contending social
groups.))114 Generally speaking, and leaving aside specific legal tests and provi-
sions which leave the court with little opportunity to engage in free exercise of
proportionality review, a court will always have to assess whether a concrete
infringement of the individual interest or right was reasonable or, especially in
cases concerning conflicts between rights, whether the infringement was justified
by the need or desire to protect another individual right or interest. In so doing, it
will investigate whether the interference was necessary and proportionate, as the
ECT does, or, as the Dutch and English courts do, whether it was manifestly
unreasonable.U'' The criteria relevant to this investigation are generally compara-
ble. The main differences are visible in the strictness or intensity of their applica-
tion, the application of detailed sub-criteria of the proportionality principle, and
the division of the burden of proof. For example, the criteria of suitability, neces-
sity and proportionality in the strict sense, or the fair balance test as applied by
the ECtHR, all imply a sophisticated and elaborate test of the reasonableness of
the interference. It is exactly this test that the national courts appear to apply as
soon as a fundamental right is at stake. By contrast, the discussion of the Dutch
and English courts' practice, and to some extent also that of the ECT, demon-
strates that these courts will usually only apply a negative and rather abstract
review when dealing with interferences with "normal" individual interests. Thus,
as soon as an infringement of a fundamental right has been established, the
character and intensity of the test change, even though the general criterion of
"reasonableness" remains the same.
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See above, section 3; cf also G. Wong, supra note 68, 101, explaining that the test of propor-
tionality and the test of manifest unreasonableness are relatively close.
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It is exactly here that the problematic side of the distinction between funda-
mental rights and individual interests becomes apparent. After all, the differences
described imply that important individual interests which cannot be classified as
a fundamental right will be less carefully scrutinised than interests which do
qualify as a fundamental right, even though such a difference is not justified by
the character and weight of the interest at stake. Similarly, in examining the bal-
ance struck between conflicting rights and interests, more weight will generally
be attached to a fundamental individual right than to another individual interest,
even though the interests concerned may be ofsimilar weight and value. Hence, it
is submitted that the test to be applied must be fitted more closely to the real sub-
stance of the individual interest at issue.!" The fact that an interest is classified as
a fundamental right should never be decisive, even though it might raise a presup-
position as to the importance ofthe underlying individual interest. A court should
always look further than this classification alone. Before engaging in an assess-
ment of the substance of the complaint, it should determine the real importance
of the individual interest at stake.l-? This implies, firstly, that it should determine
whether the harmed interest belongs to the core or rather to the periphery (or
penumbra) of a fundamental right. A court can do so by referring to the text and
context of fundamental rights provisions, as interpreted by the European Court
of Human Rights or other fundamental rights bodies. In this regard, a court
might compare the case at hand to cases already decided, placing the interests at
stake on a scale ranging from core interests to peripheral interests, and, by close
comparison, positioning the concrete interest somewhere on the scale.l!" Fur-
thermore, a court could well make use of a teleological system of interpretation.
Whether or not an interest constitutes a «core" right may then be determined by
estimating its importance to reaching the main goals of the protection of a par-
ticular fundamental right: securing human dignity, enhancing individual auton-
0my and liberty, or preserving democratic values. The more clearly the concrete
interest at stake is related to such a main goal, the more important it will be for the
court to critically review an interference. The result of such judicial exercises may
be that some individual interests will be found to be highly important, even if
they are not usually regarded as constituting an aspect of a "classic" fundamental
right. For example, if an individual has an interest in being granted a medical
device which would obviously enhance his autonomy and dignity, it will not do to
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judge that the interest is not expressly covered by a classic fundamental right and
the interference should therefore only be marginally reviewed. Instead, it should
be admitted that an important individual interest has been interfered with, and a
detailed and careful test should be applied to find out whether the device could
reasonably be refused. This should not be taken to mean that a court could never
defer to the administration or the legislature, or apply a relatively low intensity of
review. Given the importance of the interest at stake, however, the court should at
the least pay attention to such aspects as the necessity and appropriateness of a
measure or decision, and it should not place the entire burden of proof upon the
individual applicant.U?
In cases where it occurs that a peripheral interest is affected, judicial review
normally may be more relaxed. Especially if an interference has been caused in a
highly complicated policy context, or if it is the result of the exercise of wide dis-
cretionary administrative powers, there may be good reason to revert to a general
test of "manifest unreasonableness". 120 However, such a large measure of deference
should not be chosen too easily. As illustrated by the case law of the European
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distrust, as the process itself seems to be flawed. According to the footnote, such factual situa-
tions would seem to be present if core democratic rights have been restricted, since such
restrictions affect the essence of the self-correcting mechanism of the democratic system, or if
measures are taken that violate other rights which are closely related to human dignity and
autonomy. In these situations, more probing and intensive judicial scrutiny is justifiable. Thus,
the criterion defined in the Carolene Products footnote must be taken to mean that the courts
will always have to consider if there are any factual circumstances in the case before them that
could reasonably raise doubts as to the neutrality and well-functioning of the democratic proc-
ess of decision-making. Such doubts will almost always be justified if core fundamental rights
are affected, but they may also be present in cases where no such rights are at stake. A complex
set of interacting factors may be designed in order to justify an assumption of malfunction,
and, accordingly, an intensification of the test. Such a set of factors may not only be used by the
courts to decide upon the use of an intensive or a marginal test, but they may also justify an
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Court of Human Rights, the seriousness of the interference may also be of some
relevance.P' If a relatively minor individual interest has been severely harmed,
e.g. by huge financial consequences or the creation of an irrevocable situation,
there may still be reason for the court to consider the reasonableness of such
effectswith great care. Possibly some intermediary level of review, or a "neutral"
test, could be applied to such cases.
The general approach sketched here could obviously be given far more detail
and body. Indeed, interesting approaches, which may also be suitable to cases
concerning conflicts between individual rights and interests, have already been
described and employed, both in academic literature and in case law.122 In the
United States, for example, various "levels" of scrutiny are applied and elaborate
multi-tiered tests have been developed for dealing with cases concerning consti-
tutional rights.123 The case law of the European Court of Human Rights on the
scope of its margin of appreciation also offers interesting perspectives that can be
used by national courts in defining their level of review.124 Building on such gen-
eral notions and ideas, a far more acceptable judicial approach to the examination
of cases concerning conflicts between rights could be created, the methods and
standards applied by the courts and the intensity of their review being really
based on the substance of the interests at hand. The often-artificial distinction
between fundamental rights and interests, just like that between various types of
fundamental rights (political, civil, social, economic), is then replaced with a real
valuation of the character and importance of the interest or right at hand. Of
course, the inclusion of certain rights in international human rights treaties and
national constitutions and legislation will always remain relevant, as it gives a
clear indication of the perceived importance of the rights in question. Nonethe-
less, the courts should always reach further than this. Only then will they be able
to apply a suitable test, and only then will they be able to really balance conflicting
interests in a satisfactory manner.
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